

Commentary:

**A GENETIC SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON
GENTRIFICATION: FROM AUSTIN TO NICOSIA AND BACK**

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Abstract

The Largent and Quimby (2020; see this present issue of JISS) article tackled an important social issue for the community of East Austin but at the same time touched upon a social phenomenon, that of gentrification, found in many other parts of the world. Gentrification is a real problem for low-income residents as it affords a new value to old buildings and pushes real estate prices up which in turn forces poorer residents out in search of cheaper housing. Usually at the heart of gentrification processes lies a contestation around “heritage”, “community” and “desegregation” that I would like to discuss in the context of both Austin and Nicosia, the last divided capital in the word and the city where I work and am more familiar with. These entanglements of positioning around the notions of “heritage”, “community” and “desegregation” I will propose could be deepened using the theoretical framework of *genetic social psychology*.

Keywords: gentrification, genetic social psychology, social representations, Austin, Nicosia

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COMMENTARY

In this commentary I want to first underline the contribution of Largent and Quimby (2020; see this present issue of JISS) paper and then bring to the surface some issues that I believe are of central importance around discussions of the issue of gentrification but I found that there was much more space for their elaboration in the article. My reflection stems from my own research in a country completely divided along ethnic lines, Cyprus and the theoretical framework that I am elaborating on. This is the theory of *Genetic Social Psychology* (Psaltis, 2015a, 2015b) which focuses on the analysis of the articulation of processes of microgenetic, ontogenetic and sociogenetic change in the representations of actors and communities taking place at different levels of analysis (Intra-personal processes, Interpersonal, Inter-group/Positional and Social Representational or Ideological Level) as originally proposed by Willem Doise (1986).

The contribution of the Largent & Quimby article

Largent and Quimby (2020) explored the way the black community of East Austin in Texas was hit by gentrification. As stated by the authors the term *Gentrification* was coined by Marxist urban geographer and London resident Ruth Glass in 1968, as the process of repairing and rebuilding homes and businesses in a deteriorating area (such as an urban neighborhood) accompanied by an influx of middle-class or affluent people and that often results in the displacement of earlier, usually poorer residents. Participants in this research were recruited through convenience sampling of Black-owned business websites and at businesses. Six participants (5 men, 1 woman) took part in a one-time, in-person interview. These six participants were analysed as case studies with an emphasis on their attitude toward neighbourhood change, relationships with neighbours, and perception of current neighbourhood environment. Despite the fact that the authors did not interview enough people to reach saturation of themes and positions around gentrification nor did they have a representative sample of the people affected by gentrification they did contribute to unearthing variation in participants’ perceptions of the process of gentrification and along this process variations in meanings of “community” “displacement”, “heritage” and both in-group and out-group social relationships.

Firstly, they were successful in unearthing the psychological burden of displacement as the result of gentrification. Involuntary displacement or forced migration is well known to cause a series of problems like economic burden, homelessness, the separation of friends and families, heightened stress, depression, and anxiety. Displacement can be the result of different reasons and the experience of displacement under extremely violent circumstances could also be relevant for cases like Austin, at least at the psychological level of the lived experience of loss of one’s sense of “roots” and the wish for return when conditions permit. Coming from a divided country with a history of intercommunal conflict, war and ethnic cleansing where 160,000 members of the Greek

Cypriot community and about 40,000 from the Turkish Cypriot community experienced internal displacement the issue of displacement and return is an all too familiar theme of public discussion which often brings negative personal memories to many Cypriots. As it is also the case of Austin, displacement is entangled with discussions of segregation and desegregation along ethnic lines; in Cyprus they are taking place in the context of negotiations between the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot community in resolving the Cyprus problem.

In the target article the ambivalence around the process of gentrification also becomes visible since the words of the participants reveal also some benefits. In the gentrification literature possible benefits usually include economic growth, increased access to amenities and institutional resources, lower crime, and higher levels of intergroup contact (Atkinson, 2002). In the case of Austin, as we learn from previous work by Tang and Falola (2016a, 2016b) who surveyed displaced victims of gentrification and those who stayed behind increased access to amenities did not become a reality for most of the displaced and those who still live in East Austin, some increases in salaries was observed but the cost of living and property taxes also increased in East Austin. Having said that, the Largent and Quimby (2020) participants do report a decrease in crime in East Austin and more ethnic mixing.

The latter is one of my main research interests having studied Allport’s (1954) contact hypothesis in the context of divided Cyprus, and I would argue that its importance for places with a history of ethnic or racial conflict and segregation should never be underestimated. Indeed, from the genetic social psychological point of view that am advocating below intergroup contact could be seen as the motor for both ontogenetic and sociogenetic changes going in the direction of a more inclusive and tolerant society to live in.

Given that one of the aims of this commentary is to draw some parallels with the Cyprus context and then present some research findings from the *Genetic Social Psychological* framework I feel that I must first provide a short description of the Cyprus context and how Cyprus was led to division and then briefly explain the main tenets of the aforementioned theoretical framework before I return to some proposals of what else could be fruitfully studied by the authors of the target article in future research.

The Cyprus context

Cyprus is the third biggest island in the Mediterranean and it is currently ethnically divided as a result of intercommunal conflict between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the 1963-64 period and later in 1974 as the result of a coup d’état by the Greek military Junta followed by an invasion by Turkey in 1974 which resulted in the partition of the island in two and the occupation by the Turkish military of its northern 37%.

The ethnic conflict in Cyprus goes back to the 1950s when Cyprus was still part of the British Empire. Greek Cypriots (82% of the population) began to seek a union with Greece, which was opposed by the Turkish Cypriot minority (18 %) who embarked on a struggle for partition of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey. In 1960 Cyprus gained its independence and a consociational partnership between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots was established with the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, a unitary state that joined the UN. The leadership of the two communities was still committed to their diverging aspirations (partition for Turkish Cypriots and enosis -union with Greece-for Greek Cypriots) which in 1963 led to conflict over power sharing at the elite level in the form of violent inter-communal clashes and increased segregation as a reduction of cohabitation in more than 100 mixed villages (Lytras & Psaltis, 2011). After 1968 the elected president of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios made a turn in his policy away from the idea of union with Greece and towards a more realistic approach of supporting the independence of the island. However, ultra nationalist fractions still fought for enosis who came to conflict with Makarios. A coup d'état in 1974, aimed at the union of Cyprus with Greece, engineered by the Greek military junta and executed by extremist Greek Cypriot nationalists and a Greek military contingent in Cyprus prompted a military invasion by Turkey that led to fatalities, mass executions and major displacements of the population and the division of the island into two ethnically homogeneous areas. This eventually resulted in the establishment of a breakaway state by the Turkish Cypriot leadership in the north, which is recognized only by Turkey (Psaltis & Cakal, 2016). In 1977 the leaders of the two communities decided to resolve the various dossiers of the Cyprus issue under the form of a Bi-zonal, Bi-communal Federation (BBF). In 2004, the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU with the EU jurisdiction (*acquis Communautaire*) suspended in the northern part due to the unresolved issue and the failed attempt of the then UN secretary General Kofi Annan to reunite the island in 2004 with a referendum where the majority of Turkish Cypriots voted for and a majority of Greek Cypriots voted against. Since then there have been ongoing negotiations to resolve the problem and to reunify Cyprus as a BBF with various dossiers being discussed, the main ones being property, territory, security and governance.

The travel restrictions between north and south were lifted in 2003 and by 2007 about 60% of the population from both communities had visited the other side at least once (Yucel & Psaltis, 2019, 2020). It is estimated that from 2003 to 2019 more than 35,000,000 million crossings took place thus contributing towards partial desegregation of the two communities, albeit in the form of just visits from the one to the other side since the unresolved problem means that displaced people cannot yet return if they wish so, back to their properties. Still, a number of research projects has clearly shown that intergroup contact between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots led to the reduction of prejudice, increased trust and enhanced the wish for renewed cohabitation between the two communities (Psaltis, 2012, 2015b; Yucel & Psaltis, 2019, 2020).

From a most recent survey (Psaltis, manuscript in preparation) of a representative sample from both communities it was found that the percentage of originally internally displaced people, 46 years after the events of 1974 has now dropped to 19% of GCs and 14% of TCs. This is mostly due to the passing away of old IDPs and big demographic changes, especially in the north where many people migrated from Turkey, either just after 1974 as a planned settlement plan by Turkey and later on an individual initiative by people looking for a better future in the occupied by the Turkish army northern part of Cyprus. On the whole, about 1/3 of the population in each community has a family member that has been displaced and 29% of GCs and 23% of TCs own property in the other side of the existing divide, and whether they will be reclaiming back their properties, getting some monetary compensation or be given another plot of land elsewhere is a matter of discussions at the negotiating table.

Given the importance of taking into account the wishes of internally displaced people in resolving the Cyprus problem this recent research (Psaltis, manuscript in preparation) showed that when IDPs were asked to state whether they intend to return back to their homes variations to their answers depended on a number of factors like the community they belong to, gender, age and the administration under which they will be living under (their own or the other community). Greek Cypriot displaced are more likely (55%) compared to Turkish Cypriot displaced (20%) to both think about returning and wishing to return. This is expected given that the official aim of the Greek Cypriot leadership is for a solution that would satisfy to the maximum claims of return to the now occupied parts and also the master narrative of conflict in the Greek Cypriot community which is about undoing the occupation by the Turkish army (Psaltis, 2016). Older people who lived in their properties for longer time, as expected, across the divide wish for return more than younger people who only lived for a few years. There is also a gendered dimension to intention of return since men are more likely to want to return to their homes compared to women. This is probably because women feel more threatened from living with a majority from the other community compared to men. There is also a lot of interest in the answers of IDPs who state that they have no interest in returning what the reasons are for this decision. For the majority of GCs the reasons were the following: a) “I'm worried about my family's safety”, b) “There will be significant costs involved in the upgrading of my old home”, c) “I am worried about my personal security”. For the majority of TCs the reasons were the following: “I've made my life here and I do not want a restart”, “I'm worried about my family's safety”, “I would feel isolated”, “The other members of my family do not want to go back”, “There will be significant costs involved in the upgrading of my old home”, “I am worried about my personal security”. Thus, for both communities financial and security issues are important determinants of their return intentions as well as adherence to their official community narrative. For GCs it is that of return once occupation is lifted, for TCs is that of communal autonomy from domination

by GCs where return is not a priority and the integration to the social fabric of their new residence seems to be the major determinant of not wishing to return.

The issue of minority “returnees” is also of crucial importance (Stefanovic & Loizides, 2017). These are the IDPs that would be willing to return even under the administration of the other community. A dominant factor in the profile of this people is a clear pro-reconciliation stance in the representational field of the Cyprus issue since these IDPs show significantly lower levels of prejudice towards the other community and more trust which relates to increased levels of intergroup contact with members of the other community (Psaltis et al., 2020). Therefore, for successful desegregation the role of intergroup contact is of crucial importance.

The genetic social psychological approach

Psychology is in deep crisis because of its success of amassing large quantities of empirical evidence but rarely addressing the question “what for?”. The value of such accumulation of empirical evidence for the generalizing power of science is specifically questioned by Valsiner (2013, p. ix) who gives the life work of the late Gerard Duveen as “a good illustration of what kind of scholarship could bring psychology out of its crisis of limited generalization value”.

The late Gerard Duveen had the vision of formulating a *genetic social psychology* as a variant of social developmental psychology based on a dual commitment to think with and against both Jean Piaget and Serge Moscovici (Duveen, 2001; Moscovici et al., 2013). Genetic social psychology is uniquely situated to transcend the current fragmentation, as it is primarily concerned with an understanding of processes of change at both the level of the individual, interpersonal and intergroup processes and social representations or ideologies.

In viewing social representations theory as a genetic theory Duveen and Lloyd (1990) argue that a genetic perspective is implied in the conception of social representations, in the sense that the structure of any particular social representation is a construction and thus the outcome of some developmental process. Three types of transformations, associated with social representation as a process, are proposed. There is the process of *sociogenesis*, which concerns the construction and transformation of the social representations of social groups about specific objects in historical time, *ontogenesis*, which concerns the development of individuals in relation to social representations during their life time and *microgenesis*, which concerns the evocation and (re)construction of social representations in the micro-time of social interactions (Duveen & Lloyd, 1990). The interested reader can find a number of writings about microgenesis, ontogenesis and the articulation of these two processes elsewhere (Psaltis et al., 2009; Psaltis, 2015a, 2015b). In the present commentary I would like to elaborate a bit more on the understudied process of sociogenesis which is more relevant to the topic of our discussion here.

Sociogenetic Processes

As argued by Wagner (1994) sociogenetic processes are closely related to communication processes forming common sense knowledge often stimulated by practical necessities. These practical necessities usually come from changes in the conditions of life within a society that give rise to re-elaborations and rising conceptions of social objects. Sociogenetic changes can take generations to reveal themselves but they can also be accelerated by abrupt historical turning points. Such a change in the materiality of the situation on the ground, that would decisively transform intercommunal relations in Cyprus, happened in 2003, almost a generation away from today and 29 years after the war of 1974.

On 23 April 2003 the Turkish Cypriot leader in coordination with Turkey announced that he would unilaterally partially lift the travel restrictions that had been enforced since the Turkish invasion of 1974, and which had prevented Greek Cypriots from crossing into the north part of Cyprus and Turkish Cypriots from crossing into the south. Any change in the status quo of intergroup relations that made possible contact between the master narratives of one-sided collective victimization (Psaltis, 2016) was bound to cause anxiety. The historical development of the opening of the checkpoints was for both communities an unfamiliar event that needed anchoring so as to become familiar and thus an opportunity for the emergence of a new social representations of the “opening of the checkpoints”, “intercommunal contact” and its role in the solution of the Cyprus problem that took the form described by Moscovici as polemical social representations given the ideological contestation around them. As Sen and Wagner (2005) showed emerging social representations flower at the fissures of social life, that is where an existing symbolic system of interpretation fails in rendering the novel intelligible and in that sense play a role in social change. The traditional GC narratives of victimization framed the opening of the checkpoints as a ploy of the nationalist and secessionist Turkish Cypriot leader Denktaş to lure Greek Cypriots into recognizing his pseudo-state (see Demetriou, 2007; Psaltis, 2012a). But for Bi-communal NGOs that aimed at working for peace and the reunification of Cyprus the opening of the checkpoints was an event of historical significance that could become the catalyst in reducing prejudice between the two communities and building the necessary trust that would make the solution of the Cyprus problem and reunification possible.

Contesting segregation in Nicosia, Cyprus: The Home for Co-operation

As stated on the webpage of the Greek Cypriot municipality of Nicosia¹ the city is “the only divided capital in the world today”. Nicosia is divided in two equal portions north and south separated by the UN patrolled Buffer Zone. With the opening of checkpoints in 2003 a pedestrian crossing was opened just outside the old walled city of Nicosia and another crossing for vehicles a few kilometres away from the centre. A few years later on in 2008 the central commercial road Ledras Street within the old walled city on Nicosia

was also opened up for pedestrians as a confidence building measure by two pro-reconciliation leaders, Dimitris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat. Such an opening in the walled city of Nicosia was a decisive move towards breaking down the psychological barriers between the two communities and for imagining Nicosia as a united space. This was a move at the higher possible political level, that encouraged grassroots and civil society contacts that were added to initiatives at the municipality level that already started since 1979 with the Nicosia Master plan² and supported by the United Nations. The Nicosia Master Plan is a comprehensive action aimed at dealing with the planning challenges posed by a divided city, drawn up through the collaboration of the city’s two communities and under the auspices and the financial backing of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). As we learn from the official web page of the plan “The programme’s main objective, as it was defined in 1979 following an agreement between representatives of the two communities, was to improve current and future living conditions for all residents of Nicosia”.

On 6 May 2011, another significant addition towards the same aim took place, this time at the civil society level. Near the open checkpoint of Ledra Palace Hotel along the 180-km patrolled United Nations (UN) Buffer Zone of Cyprus, a new political “third space” was launched. Leaders of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, with the bicomunal NGO Association for Historical Dialogue and Research (AHDR), inaugurated the Home for Co-operation (H4C), an “infrastructure of peace” intended to turn a “dead zone into a zone of co-operation” (Till et al., 2013). The H4C embodies an initiative that results from the states of exception that constitute Cyprus and the spatial practices of Cypriots who seek to overcome the legacies of a violent and costly “intractable conflict” (Bar-Tal & Teichman, 2005). The establishment of the H4C offered a model for scholars and activists in other divided contexts in at least three ways, by challenging states of exception, dismantling division through transformative knowledge, and creating safe spaces of encounter (Till et al., 2013). From a social representations point of view the academic research and work of AHDR created ample opportunities for reflection on the one sided history teaching in the educational systems across the divide and through the years educational material produced by AHDR was used in the official educational system of both communities as supplementary educational material in collaboration with experts from the *Council of Europe*.

The Home for Co-operation itself is also turning into a symbol of intercommunal cooperation with time (Psaltis et al., 2014). For example, candidates for elections are creating photo opportunities for themselves outside the Home for Co-operation to indicate their support to the bi-communal cause. Also, the Bi-communal Technical Committee on Education that was appointed by the leaders of the two communities in 2015 Nicos Anastasiades and Mustafa Akinci to suggest ways that the educational system could build a culture of peace and co-operation between the two communities has implemented the “Imagine” programme³ which concerns a contact scheme that brings students and teachers

from both communities at the Home for Cooperation to work together for a few hours during working school hours. From a sociogenetic point of view this was a significant moment because NGO initiatives were incorporated into official policy at the higher political level satisfying one of the conditions that Allport suggested are crucial for successful prejudice reduction via intergroup contact, that of support by authorities (Allport, 1954).

The process of reclaiming a space in the UN patrolled Buffer Zone in Nicosia can also be seen as a form of memorialization of the heritage of a post-conflict or segregated setting for the purpose of taking a critical stance towards war itself and the pain and sorrow that the creation of dead spaces and derelict buildings brings in people in the urban landscape. But to the extent that it is a part of a bigger gentrification process (Demetriou & Ilican, 2019) taking place in Nicosia such benign efforts of conflict transformation through the Nicosia Master Plan or the H4C can also bring with them the unintended consequences of displacement of other “others” who found a cheap refuge in the area like immigrants and refugees from other countries now in Cyprus or loss of public and common space lost to private investment in the area.

Some hidden issues: Representations, Identities, Resistance

Sociogenetic processes transform representations in historical time; such changes are set in motion through the formation and transformation of social representations in social interactions both within and between groups. This was argued convincingly by the late Gerard Duveen in his last paper (Duveen, 2008) with the title “Social Actors and Social Groups: A Return to Heterogeneity in Social Psychology” where he proposes different definitions of groups depending on the communicative genre through which they form their social representations. In the context of the Cyprus issue in our past work we identified three distinct positions in the representational field of the Cyprus issue in each community (Psaltis, 2012a). In this sense there is no single community and there is a struggle to define the ethical horizon and limits of the community. First there is the pro-reconciliation position. The profile of this position is the people who stress a Cyprio-centric definition of their national identity. A Cypriot for this group is both a Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot. Then there is a mono-communal definition of a Cypriot where the subgroup identity is projected to the superordinate without any consideration or contact with members of the other community. And finally there is identification with being Greek for GCs and Turk for TCs as the continuation of the Greek and Turkish ethnic nationalism in Cyprus which sees Cyprus as a part of greater nations of Greek and Turkey respectively and also avoids contact with members of the other community. Furthermore, this is stance that clearly separates further the two communities and when accompanied by slogans like “Cyprus is Greek” for Greek Cypriots and “Cyprus is Turkish” for Turkish Cypriots makes reconciliation and compromise less likely by enhancing a sense of collective ownership (Stortz et al., 2020). Thus, the content of each identification takes its meaning through the

absence or presence of symbolic or actual contact with various out-groups. These varying representations of community go hand in hand with different representations of the “Cyprus issue”. The communal and the ethno-nationalist positions are closely aligned with the official definitions of what the problem is as they are propagated through the educational systems and the ethnocentric history textbooks of each community (Makriyianni & Psaltis, 2007; Psaltis et al., 2017). On the contrary the pro-reconciliation positions depart from one sided narrations of collective victimisation and take a more critical stance of nationalism and a more multiperspective approach to history teaching. From a sociogenetic perspective the work the Bi-communal NGO AHDR comes to add weight and promote a position of reconciliation. Resistance to these processes of social influence are expected from the other positions that find their own positions that where historically hegemonic now being challenged and there are plenty of cases when the work of AHDR has been attacked by the nationalist media or group in social media.

Back to Austin

There are some interesting parallels that one could draw from the historical accounts of segregation and desegregation in the two contexts. In Austin racist town planning separated East Austin from the rest of Austin in 1928. With time, through processes of redlining, it became a ghetto area and only desegregation of the 50s brought a fairer distribution of national resources in East Austin. In the case of Cyprus it was the conflicting national aspiration of the two communities that brought intercommunal conflict in 1963-64 which led to the gradual collapse of mixed living in 114 mixed villages (Lytras & Psaltis, 2011) and major towns along with the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots from both governance and mixed cohabitation areas. Such a move led TCs to live in enclaves establishing their own temporary administration (Patrick, 1976). In Austin the situation never came to a secession scenario, which is probably due to the absence of a militarily powerful neighbouring “motherland” like Turkey was for Turkish Cypriots who supported (or according to the GC narrative actually engineered in the first place) secession. In Austin it was the existence of a Federal Supreme Court that exerted the necessary pressure for desegregation in the fifties. In Cyprus there was no such Federal structure in place since the consociation constitution was already failed by 1964 and the Republic of Cyprus was now functioning as monocommunal republic governed by the elected leader of the Greek Cypriot community Archbishop Makarios; this led to further isolation of Turkish Cypriots and their complete dependence on Turkey.

The observation that in the case of Cyprus a history of institutional racism was entangled into relationships with bigger entities and imported nationalisms from the regional context reminds us that in apparent internal issues there are usually external interferences by countries with an explicit or hidden agenda. Beyond the so called “motherlands” in the Cyprus issue another dimension was the historical entanglement of

the Cyprus issue with the cold war antagonism between USA and the Soviet Union. Whilst USA was clearly in favour of a plan that would keep Greece and Turkey (two NATO allies) happy and did not mind the partition of the island, the USSR supported independence of Cyprus before 1974. However, after 1974 USA supported a quick resolution of the problem in the form of a Bizonal-Bicommunal Federation whilst the USSR then and Russia today supported a status quo that would keep Greece and Turkey fighting over Cyprus, thus weakening the south-eastern flank of NATO. And for those who might fail to see how such renewed Cold war dynamics influence internal issues even in Austin the reader might want to remind themselves of the case of the involvement of Russians fuelling separatist claims of Texas nationalists⁴ that was resisted by Austin citizens who made a petition to remain part of the USA in case Texas was exiting USA⁵ in 2016.

As originally proposed by Willem Doise (1986) social psychological or social developmental phenomenon should be studied through an effort to articulate four levels of analysis (intra-personal, interpersonal, intergroup/positional and social representational/ideological). In extending their insightful and important work Largent and Quimby (2020) could attempt a mixed methods study that would identify the different ideological positions within both Whites and Afro-Americans of Texas and Austin in particular. This could be a representative sample survey that would ask about their attitude towards the gentrification process and also their stance towards each other, realistic and symbolic threats and identification at the subgroup/communal (ethnic) and state level (Texan) and superordinate (American). It could also explore claims for secession of Texas and identify the ideological links between the various stances. This will bring to the surface the ideological conflict and resistance (Duveen, 2001) around processes of gentrification that lie under the surface and potentially relate to external interference also.

From the Genetic Social Psychological point of view it is also important to articulate the microgenetic, ontogenetic and sociogenetic processes of social representations of gentrification. This admittedly demands the dedication and resources of a long-term research program that would cover both ontogenetic time by studying changes in the representations of people depending on their age and developmental level. For example, how is it perceived by children who attend schools both in East Austin and schools outside East Austin once they were displaced in different ages? Are there any narratives that hold the memory of return alive to the previous homes (like most Greek Cypriot IDPs in Cyprus) or are they talking about a new beginning not looking back (like most Turkish Cypriot IDPs in Cyprus) to their previous life? From a sociogenetic point of view how do social representations of gentrification change through decades depending on media discourses in both African American and the rest of the press?

Another important point to consider is microgenetic processes of change when people with different stances from the same community come together to discuss the issue of gentrification. As we have seen a community should not be taken as something homogeneous and the different positions within it should be identified. An optimum

method from the exploration of microgenetic processes is focus group discussions where arguments in favour and against a topic can be made clear in a vivid manner. Marková et al. (2007) work on analyzing social representations through focus group discussions is exemplary in this respect.

To conclude, there are many parallels one could draw from contexts of displacement and segregation due to ethnic conflict that would be relevant to the context of gentrification in contexts of majority-minority relations within a nation state. I hope that I have indicated some possible avenues for this exploration and pointed to a theoretical framework that can be fruitfully applied to do research exploring the issue of gentrification in many other parts of the world.

Footnotes:

1. <https://www.nicosia.org.cy/en-GB/municipality/services/nmp/introduction/>
2. <https://www.nicosia.org.cy/en-GB/municipality/services/nmp/introduction/>
3. <https://www.ahdr.info/peace-education/58-education-for-a-culture-of-peace-imagine>
4. <https://mashable.com/2017/11/07/calexit-texit-russia-internet-research-agency/?europe=true>
5. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Texas_secession_movements

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